We present a single-database computationally private information retrieval scheme with polylogarithmic communication complexity. Our construction is based on a new, but reasonable intractability assumption, which we call the Φ-Hiding Assumption (ΦHA): essentially the difficulty of deciding whether a small prime > 2 divides ϕ(m), where m is a composite integer of unknown factorization. Our result also implies the existence of two-round CS proof systems under a concrete complexity assumption.
Introduction
Private information retrieval. The beautiful notion of private information retrieval (PIR for short) was introduced by Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz and Sudan [CGKS95] and has already received a lot of attention. The study of PIR is motivated by the growing concern about the user's privacy when querying a large commercial database. (The problem was independently studied by Cooper and Birman [CB95] to implement an anonymous messaging service for mobile users.)
Ideally, the PIR problem consists of devising a communication protocol involving just two parties, the database and the user, each having a secret input. The database's secret input is called the data string, an n-bit string B = b 1 b 2 · · · b n . The user's secret input is an integer i between 1 and n. The protocol should enable the user to learn b i in a communication-efficient way and at the same time hide i from the database. (The trivial and inefficient solution is having the database send the entire string B to the user.)
Information-theoretic PIRs (with database replication). Surprisingly, the original paper [CGKS95] shows that the PIR problem is solvable efficiently in an information-theoretic setting if
The ΦSA states that it is possible to efficiently find a random composite m such that a given prime p divides ϕ(m).
The ΦA is attractively simple and concrete. Finding crisp and plausible assumptions is an important task in the design and analysis of cryptographic protocols, and we believe that the ΦA will prove useful in other contexts and will attract further study. Based on it we prove the following Main Theorem: Under the ΦA, there is a two-round CPIR whose communication complexity is polylogarithmic in n (and polynomial in the security parameter).
We note that our CPIR is "essentially optimal" in several ways:
Communication complexity. Disregarding the privacy of the user input altogether, in order for the user to obtain the ith bit of an n-bit data string, at least log n bits have to be communicated between the user and the database in any case.
Computational complexity. Our CPIR is also very efficient from a computational-complexity point of view. Namely, (1) the user runs in time polylogarithmic in n (and polynomial in k), and (2) the database runs in time linear in n (and polynomial in k). Both properties are close to optimal in our context. The user computational complexity is close to optimal because, as already mentioned, in any scheme achieving sub-linear communication the user must send at least log n bits of information, and thus perform at least log n steps of computation. The database computational complexity is close to optimal because the database must read each bit of its data string in any PIR. (Otherwise, it would know that the user cannot possibly have received any of the unread bits and therefore gain some information about the user input i.)
Round complexity. The round complexity of our CPIR is essentially optimal because, as long as the user can choose his own input i at will in each execution, no single-round CPIR exists 1 .
Privacy model. Our CPIR achieves computational privacy. Although information-theoretic privacy is stronger, our scheme is optimal among single-database PIRs since there are no singledatabase PIRs with information-theoretic privacy (other than sending the entire data string).
Applications. Our result provides the first two-round implementation of computationally sound proofs [Mic94] under a concrete complexity assumption. One-round implementations of CS proofs were previously shown to exist assuming a random oracle (far from a concrete assumption), and three-round implementations were known assuming the existence of collision-resistant hash functions. The details will be given in the full version of the paper. Combined with the techniques developed by Gertner et al. [GIKM98] , our CIR achieves the first two-database implementation of symmetrically private information retrieval (SPIR) with polylogarithmic communication complexity. A SPIR scheme guarantees that not only the privacy of the user is protected but also the privacy of the data, that is, the user learns only b i and no other information about b j for j ̸ = i.
Preliminaries and Definitions

Notation
Integers. We denote by N I the set of natural numbers. Unless otherwise specified, a natural number is presented in its binary expansion whenever given as an input to an algorithm. If n ∈ N I , by 1 n we denote the unary expansion of n, that is, the concatenation of n 1's. Computation models. By an algorithm we mean a (probabilistic) Turing machine. By saying that an algorithm is efficient we mean that, for at most but an exponentially small fraction of its random tapes, it runs in fixed polynomial time. By a k-gate circuit we mean a finite function computable by an acyclic circuitry k Boolean gates, where each gate is either a NOT-gate (with one input and one output) or an AND gate (with two binary inputs and one binary output).
Probability spaces. (Taken from [BDMP91] and [GMR88] .) If A(·) is an algorithm, then for any input x, the notation "A(x)" refers to the probability space that assigns to the string σ the probability that A, on input x, outputs σ. If S is a probability space, then "x R ← S" denotes the algorithm which assigns to x an element randomly selected according to S. If F is a finite set, then the notation "x R ← F " denotes the algorithm which assigns to x an element selected according to the probability space whose sample space is F and uniform probability distribution on the sample points.
If
denotes the probability that p(x, y, · · · ) will be true after the ordered execution of the algorithms
Fully Polylogarithmic CPIR
Our proposed CPIR works in only two rounds and achieves both polylogarithmic communication complexity and polylogarithmic user computational complexity. For the sake of simplicity, we formalize only such types of CPIRs below. 
We call a, b, c, and d the fundamental constants (of the CPIR); B the data string; D the database algorithm; the pair (Q, R) the user algorithm; Q the query generator ; R the response retriever ; q the query; s the secret (associated to q); r the response; and k the security parameter. (Intuitively, query q contains user input i, and response r contains database bit b i , but both contents are unintelligible without secret s.)
Remarks.
1. Our correctness constraint slightly generalizes the one of [KO97] : Whereas there correctness is required to hold with probability 1, we require it to hold with very high probability.
2. As mentioned above, the communication complexity of our CPIR is polylogarithmic in n (the length of the data string) and polynomial in k (the security parameter). Because k is an independent parameter, it is of course possible to choose it so large that the polynomial dependence on k dominates over the polylogarithmic dependence on n. But choosing k is an overkill since our definition guarantees "an exponential amount of privacy" also when k is only polylogarithmic in n.
Number Theory
Some useful sets. Let us define the sets we need in our assumptions and constructions. Some useful facts. Let us state without proof some basic or well-known number-theoretic facts used in constructing our CPIR.
Fact 1:
There exists an efficient algorithm that on input a outputs a random prime in PRIMES a .
Fact 2:
There exists an efficient algorithm that on input a outputs a random element of H a .
Fact 3:
There exists an efficient algorithm that, on input a b-bit prime p and an integer m together with its integer factorization, outputs whether or not p ∈ H b (m).
Fact 4:
There exists an efficient algorithm that, on inputs x, p, m, and m's integer factorization, outputs whether or not x has a pth root mod m.
Our assumptions.
The Φ-Assumption (ΦA):
• Φ-Sampling Assumption (ΦSA): ∀k > h, there exists a sampling algorithm S(·) such that for all k-bit primes p, S(p) outputs a random k f -bit number m ∈ H k k f that ϕ-hides p, together with m's integer factorization.
We refer to e, f, g, and h as the first, second, third, and fourth fundamental constant of the ΦA, respectively.
Remarks.
1. Revealing a large prime dividing ϕ(n) may compromise n's factorization. Namely, if p is a prime > n 1/4 and p|ϕ(n), then one can efficiently factor n on inputs n and p [Cop98, Cop96b, Cop96a] . Consequently, it is easy to decide whether p divides ϕ(n) whenever p > n 1/4 . But nothing similar is known when p is much smaller, and for the ΦHA, it suffices that deciding whether p divides ϕ(n) is hard when p is not just a constant fraction shorter than n, but polynomially shorter.
We further note that if the complexity of factoring is Ω(2 log n c ) for some constant c between 0 and 1, then revealing a prime p dividing ϕ(n) cannot possibly compromise n's factorization significantly if log p is significantly smaller than (log n) c . Indeed, since p can be represented using at most log p bits, revealing p cannot contribute more than a speed-up of 2 ⌈log p⌉ ≈ p for factoring n.
The ΦSA is weaker than the well-known and widely accepted Extended Riemann Hypothesis (ERH). Consider the following algorithm S(·):
Inputs: a k-bit prime p. 
Our CPIR
The High-Level Design
At a very high level, the user's query consists of a compact program that contains the user input i in a hidden way. The database runs this program on its data string, and the result of this computation is its response r.
A bit more specifically, this compact program is actually run on the data string in a bit-by-bit fashion. Letting B be the data string, the user sends the database an algorithm A and a k-bit value x 0 (where k is the security parameter), and the database computes a sequence of k-bit values: (x 1 , B 2 ) , . . . , x n = A(x n−1 , B n ). The last value x n is the response r. The user retrieves B i by evaluating on x n a predicate R i , which is hard to guess without the secret key of the user.
This high-level design works essentially because the predicate R i further enjoys the following properties relative to the sequence of values x 0 , . . . , x n : 
The Implementation
To specify our polylog CPIR we must give a database algorithm D and user algorithms Q (query generator) and R (response retriever). These algorithms use two common efficient subroutines T and P that we describe first. Algorithm T could be any probabilistic primality test [SS77, Rab81], but we let it be a primality prover [GK86, AH87] so as to gain some advantage in the notation and presentation (at the expense of running time).
Basic inputs.
A number n ∈ N I ; an n-bit sequence B; an integer i ∈ [1, n]; and a unary security parameter 1 k such that k > (log n) 2 .
Primality prover T (·).
Input: an integer z (in binary).
Output: 1 if z is prime, and 0 if z is composite.
Code for T (z): See [AH87].
Prime(-Sequence) generator P (·, ·, ·).
Inputs: an integer a ∈ [1, n]; a sequence of k 3 k-bit strings Y = (y 0 , . . . , y k 3 −1 ); and 1 k .
Output: a k-bit integer p a (a prime with overwhelming probability). Because P is deterministic, for Y and k fixed, it generates a sequence of (probable) primes p 1 , . . . , p n with a = 1, . . . , n.
, where all strings y l and σ aj are interpreted as elements of GF (2 k ) and the operations are in GF (2 k ). 4. If T (z j ) = 1 or j = 2 k−log n , then return p a ← z j and halt; else, j ← j + 1 and go to step 2.
Query generator Q(·, ·, ·).
Inputs: n; an integer i ∈ 
Database algorithm D(·, ·, ·).
Inputs: B; q = (m, x, Y ), a query output by Q(n, i, 1 k ); and 1 k . 
Proof of the Theorem
Running time (sketch). Subroutine P is efficient because (on inputs i, Y , and 1 k ) its most intensive operation consists, for at most k 3 times, of evaluating once a k-degree polynomial over GF (2 k ) and running the primality prover T . Algorithm Q is efficient because subroutines P and T are efficient, because p i is a k-bit prime with overwhelming probability, and because, under the ΦSA, selecting a random 2k f -bit composite ∈ H k k f ϕ-hiding p i is efficient. (Notice that, because n and i are presented in binary, Q actually runs in time polylogarithmic in n.) Algorithm D is efficient because it performs essentially one exponentiation mod m for each bit of the data string (and thus runs in time polynomial in k and linear in n). Algorithm R is efficient because of Fact 4 and because it has m's factorization (the secret s) available as an input. (R actually runs in time polynomial in k because m's length is polynomial in k.)
Correctness (sketch). Let us start with a quick and dirty analysis of the prime-sequence generator P . Because the elements of Y are randomly and independently selected, in every execution of P (a, n, 1 k ), the k-bit values z 0 , . . . , z 2 k−log n are k 3 -wise independent. Thus with probability lower bounded by 1 − 2 O(−k 2 ) , at least one of them is prime, and thus p a is prime. Because the length n of the data string satisfies n 2 < 2 k , with probability exponentially (in k) close to 1, all possible outputs p 1 , . . . , p n are primes. Actually, with probability exponentially (in k) close to 1, p 1 , . . . , p n consists of random and distinct primes of length k. Observe that the k f -bit modulus m can ϕ-hide at most a constant number of primes from a set of randomly chosen k-bit primes except with exponentially (in k) small probability. Thus, with probability still exponentially (in k) close to 1, p i will be the only prime in our sequence to divide ϕ(m).
In sum, because it suffices for correctness to hold with exponentially (in k) high probability, we might as well assume that, in every execution of Q(n, i, 1 k ), p 1 , . . . , p n are indeed random, distinct primes of length k, such that only p i divides ϕ(m). Let R i be the following predicate on Z Z * m :
1 if x has a p i th root mod m 0 otherwise.
The user retrieves b i by evaluating R i (x n ). It is easy to check that properties 1-4 of our high-level design hold as promised:
This property follows from the fact that the function x → x p j mod m on Z Z * m is 1-to-1 if p j is relatively prime to ϕ(m), and at least p j -to-1 otherwise. Because p i is in Θ(2 k ) except with exponentially (in k) small probability, the probability that a random element of Z Z * m has a p i th root mod m is also exponentially small (in k). Thus we might as well assume that x 0 has no p i th roots mod m (remember that correctness should hold only most of the time). 
(Intuitively, A's advantage ε is always bigger than any exponentially small in k quantity.) Define now the following probability:
(Notice that, in the sequence of experiments defining β, Y still defines a prime p i and a prime p j with overwhelming probability, but there is no guarantee that m ϕ-hides either of them.) It follows
We can construct a guessing circuit C = C n,i to contradict the ΦHA as follows.
Guessing circuit C n,i (·, ·).
Inputs: a number m ∈ H k k f ; and a k-bit prime p. Output: a bit b (indicating whether m ϕ-hides p). ←H k (m) with probability 1/2) and calculate the probability that C guesses correctly from which distribution p is drawn.
The distribution of the output of C depends directly on A. If p Note that case 3 is actually how A is called by our C in the ΦHA and occurs with overwhelming probability. Let δ 0 be the probability of case 1, which will be computed below, and assume for the moment that p i is indeed a random k-bit prime. The probability δ 1 that a random element of PRIMES k is in H k (m) is upper bounded by k f 2 −k = O(2 −k/2 ). (This is the conditional probability of case 2 above given that p i is prime.) For C, this implies
Now consider the case that no prime is detected among a 1 , . . . , a k 3 in step 2. Because T is an ideal primality prover, this probability is at most about (1 − 1 k ) k 3 and therefore δ 0 = O(2 −k/2 ). We can now bound PROB [ C correct] as
The last inequality follows from the assumption α 1 − β ≥ ε/2. To conclude, C distinguishes correctly with probability at least
Intuitively, since δ 1 and δ 0 are exponentially small in k, but ε exceeds any exponentially small quantity, there remains an advantage for C that is not exponentially small and it is clear that C violates the ΦHA.
